Probability kinematics (Jeffrey, 1965(Jeffrey, , 1983) furnishes a method for revising a prior probability specification based upon new probabilities over a partition. We develop a corresponding Bayes linear kinematic for a Bayes linear analysis given information which changes our beliefs about a random vector in some generalised way. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for commutativity of successive Bayes linear kinematics which depend upon the eigenstructure of the joint kinematic resolution transform. As an application we introduce the Bayes linear Bayes graphical model, which is a mixture of fully Bayesian and Bayes linear graphical models, combining the simplicity of Gaussian graphical models with the ability to allow conditioning on marginal distributions of any form, and exploit Bayes linear kinematics to embed full conditional updates within Bayes linear belief adjustments. The theory is illustrated with a treatment of partition testing for software reliability.
I
There are two broad ways in which our beliefs may change. First, within a formal system, such as a Bayesian model, we may observe evidence within the scope of the model, and update beliefs by the formal reasoning process of the system, for example by probabilistic conditioning. Secondly, we may use some argument outside the formal system; for example our beliefs may change by pure reflection, based on unexpected sensory stimuli, and so forth. In certain cases, the two approaches may be intertwined. For example, given a formal system, we may change beliefs about certain elements of the system using informal reasoning processes. How should we propagate the informal changes through the formal system? A much discussed case of such mixed reasoning concerns a Bayesian probabilistic system, where the prior probabilities over a partition X=(X 1 , . . . , X k ) change by observation and introspection, as opposed to formal conditioning, from old values P o (X i ) to new values P n (X i ), without affecting the conditional probabilities for certain further events H given the elements of the partition, so that
for all i, the so-called rigidity or sufficiency condition. Jeffrey (1965 Jeffrey ( , 1983 describes the updating scheme termed probability kinematics in which the new probability for such H is evaluated by the natural formula
The probability measure P n is said to come from P o by probability kinematics on P n (X). Note that if X were observed so that P n (X i )=X i with X i =0 or 1 and W k i=1 X i =1 then P n (H ) would be the conditional probability of H given X. Probability kinematics thus generalises probability conditioning. An important special case, see for example Skyrms (1980) , Diaconis & Zabell (1982) and Jeffrey (1988) , occurs if D represents some observed data for which we judge that H and D are probabilistically conditionally independent given X, so that P o (H|X i , D)=P o (H|X i ) for each i. In that case P n (H )=P o (H|D). In this paper, we derive the corresponding kinematic form for a Bayes linear analysis, when, rather than observing random quantities X, we instead only receive partial information which changes our beliefs about X in some generalised way. We term this updating scheme Bayes linear kinematics. In probability kinematics there has been much debate about the fact that successive probability kinematics based upon different partitions do not necessarily commute when the order of updating is reversed. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for commutativity of successive Bayes linear kinematics.
One of our principal motivations for developing Bayes linear kinematics is to enable the construction that we term the Bayes linear Bayes graphical model. This is a mixture of fully Bayesian and Bayes linear graphical models, which combines the simplicity and tractability of belief specification and analysis of Gaussian graphical models with the ability to allow conditioning on marginal distributions of any form. We show how such models may be analysed by using Bayes linear kinematics to embed conditional updates within Bayes linear belief adjustments, and we illustrate such modelling in the context of partition testing for software reliability.
B  
In a Bayes linear analysis, prior mean, variance and covariance statements over a collection of random quantities are adjusted by linear fitting, when certain members of the collection are observed. We may view such an analysis either as a simple, tractable approximation to a full Bayes analysis or as the appropriate analysis when we have only made the corresponding partial belief specification, within a formulation where, following de Finetti (1974) , expectation, rather than probability, is the primitive; for an overview see Goldstein (1999) .
Suppose that X and Y are two collections of random quantities and that X and Y respectively denote the collections of all linear combinations of the random quantities contained in X and Y. We may represent X as an r×1 vector, specify our prior mean vector and prior variance matrix and collect these together as tXr={E(X), var (X)}. The specification tXr uniquely determines the second-order specification of all linear combinations of the random quantities contained in X, namely X . If we consider Y as a s×1 vector, specifying E(Y ) and var (Y) yields the specification tYr, whilst specification Bayes linear kinematics of the covariance matrix cov (X, Y) allows the construction of tBr, where B=XnY. The Bayes linear adjusted mean and variance for Y given X are given by
where W X(Y) =cov (Y, X) var−1(X). For simplicity of exposition, we assume that var (X) is invertible. If it is not, then we may use an appropriate generalised inverse in its place. For the adjustment of Y by X, we denote the adjusted specification, {E X (Y), var X (Y)}, by tY/Xr. Here E X (Y) is uncorrelated with Y−E X (Y) and so, using (4), we may write var (Y)=var X (Y)+var {E X (Y)}. We denote var {E X (Y)}, the variability of Y resolved by X, by Rvar X (Y). We now consider how the Bayes linear analysis should be modified when, rather than observing X, we instead receive information which changes our beliefs about X in some generalised way, without affecting our adjusted beliefs for Y given X, in the sense that, were we not to learn the value of X, then the preceding information would be deemed irrelevant to the subsequent belief adjustment. D 1. L et B=XnY be a collection of random quantities with a secondorder specification, tBr o ={E o (B), var o (B)}, attached. We call tBr o the old specification for B. If a new specification, tXr n ={E n (X), var n (X)}, for X is given then we say the new specification tBr n ={E n (B), var n (B)} comes from the old specification tBr o by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr n if the following two Bayes linear suYciency conditions are satisfied:
Here E oX (Y) denotes the old assignment for the adjusted expectation evaluated using (3) with the old specification tBr o , while E nX (Y) denotes the new assignment for the adjusted expectation evaluated using (3) with the new specification tBr n . Similarly, var oX (Y) and var nX (Y) are the old and new assignments for the adjusted variances evaluated from (4) using tBr o and tBr n respectively. The Bayes linear sufficiency conditions, (5) and (6), may be succinctly expressed as the requirement that tY/Xr o =tY/Xr n . Note that (5) coincides with (1) in the case of full conditioning. If Y is an event, and X represents a partition (X 1 , . . . , X k ) so that each X i =0 or 1 and W k i=1 X i =1, then, replacing Y and each X i by the corresponding indicator functions for the events, we have
Thus E X (Y) is the random quantity which takes the value P(Y|X i ) if the event X i occurs, and conditions (5) and (1) are equivalent for this case. Our present concern is to generalise the kinematics relationship (2) within the Bayes linear formulation. We have the following theorem. T 1. T he Bayes linear suYciency conditions (5) and (6) are equivalent to the requirement that
where W is equal to either Y or B and
Proof. We demonstrate the results for W=Y. The results for W=B follow immediately from these. We may decompose Y as
where R oX (Y) is the residual from the Bayes linear fit, so that cov
As E oX (Y) is a linear function of X,
Thus, from (5), E nX {R oX (Y)}=0. Therefore, from (3), we may deduce that
Thus, if we use (11) and (12), our new expectation for Y must be
and (8) follows from (3). From (13) we may deduce that cov n {E oX (Y), R oX (Y)}=0 and hence, from (11), our new variance for Y must be
where (14) follows from (5) and (4). Use of (6) in (14) gives (9). From (11) and (13), our new covariance between Y and X must be
and (10) thus follows from (3). % Therefore, obtaining tBr n from tBr o by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr n consists of, for W=Y, replacing X in the expression (3) by the new expectation for X to give the new expectation for Y, adding the expression
to the adjusted variance (4) to give the new variance for Y, and multiplying the old covariance between Y and X by var−1 o (X) var n (X) to give the new covariance. Note, in particular, that, if X is observed, then var n (X)=0 so that tBr n =tB/Xr o . Thus, Bayes linear kinematics generalises Bayes linear adjustment to the case where the change in belief over X may not result in X being known with certainty.
An important special case arises when D is a further vector of random quantities for which the partial correlations between Y and D given X are zero, so that
We say (Goldstein, 1990; Goldstein & O'Hagan, 1996) Suppose that A is a further vector of random quantities and let B*=AnXnY, with tB*r o and tB*r n respectively denoting the old and new second-order specification for B*. We have the following theorem, the proof of which is in the Appendix.
T 2. If tB*r n is obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr n then tB*r n is equivalently obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tBr n , where B=XnY.
Thus, the kinematic for B* may be constructed sequentially by first using tXr n to construct tBr n and then using tBr n to obtain tB*r n .
B    
3·1. Introducing the model and single source adjustment In modelling complex systems, experts are often prepared to make full marginal probabilistic specifications, but may not feel able to make a meaningful, full joint probabilistic assessment over all of the quantities in the system. For example, we might have detailed historical records of reliability of individual components of a system, but the joint data required for the full specification may not have been retained. Specification of full joint distributions with given marginals can be a difficult problem; see for example Bedford & Cooke (2002) . In contrast, we make explicit the different levels of detail specified by the experts, fusing full marginal probability specifications with joint second-order belief specifications, and we develop a formalism for updating these mixed beliefs, based on Bayes linear kinematics. Such models will allow the flexibility, tractability and simplicity of the Bayes linear formalism, while retaining much of the power of the fully specified Bayesian model. A directed graphical model is a directed graph G=(V , E), where V ={A 1 , . . . , A t } is the collection of nodes and E the collection of edges. Each A i represents a collection of quantities and if
, where (.a.)|. is the generalised conditional independence relationship for the graph (Smith, 1989) . When the generalised conditional independence relationship is probabilistic conditional independence then the model is termed the Bayesian graphical model (Lauritzen, 1996; Cowell et al., 1999) , and taking second-order belief separation as the generalised conditional independence relationship yields the Bayes linear graphical model (Goldstein, 1990; Goldstein & Wilkinson, 2000) . The construction we introduce, which we term a Bayes linear Bayes graphical model, links Bayesian and Bayes linear graphical models and is as follows.
is a random vector; we make a full second-order prior specification over all elements of B* and denote this by tB*r o .
Stage 2. Certain nodes B g are also elements of disjoint Bayesian graphical models
We make a full joint probabilistic specification over the elements of each G V* g which we denote by f o (v* g ).
Stage 3. The belief specification is completed by the condition, for each g, that, given B g , the collection D* g is conditionally independent of all the remaining elements of B* and of all elements of each D* h (hNg).
In Bayes linear Bayes models we typically want to learn about B* by observation of some elements contained in the Bayesian graphical models. For a single model this is achieved as follows.
Suppose that, for the Bayes linear Bayes graphical model, we observe
) is a Bayesian graphical model, we may perform conditioning to obtain the posterior distribution of V * g given D g . In particular, we may construct
)}, where
Since, from Stage 3, D g is separated from B* by B g , we may impose the Bayes linear sufficiency conditions E oB g (B*)=E gB g (B*) and var oB g (B*)=var gB g (B*). Thus, from Definition 1, we may obtain tB*r g from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tB g r g , where, from Theorem 1 and (15),
). Bayes linear kinematics therefore provides a methodology for embedding a full probability update into a Bayes linear model.
3·2. Example: Partition testing
As an example of the application of the Bayes linear Bayes graphical model, we describe a problem related to the assessment of software reliability. Rees et al. (2001) gives a discussion of software-testing in industry, focusing upon the potential benefits from a Bayesian approach to software-testing. Coolen et al. (2001) describe a Bayes linear approach to the particular software assessment method termed partition testing. In partition testing, the input domain I is partitioned into k disjoint subdomains, I 1 , . . . , I k , such that observation of the performance of each member of the subdomain is judged to have the same effect upon our knowledge of the performance of the system. Let X gi be the value of the ith input in the I g th subdomain. Suppose that X gi equals one or zero, depending on whether the test with this input fails or succeeds. Let X g ={X g1 , X g2 , . . .} be the total collection of values for the potential inputs for the I g th subdomain. Each X g is judged to be an exchangeable sequence of events and in the I g th subdomain we consider performing n g tests which we gather together as C(n g )={X g1 , . . . , X gn g }. The total collection of tests is denoted by C(N)=^k g=1 C(n g ). Suppose that the size of each subdomain is sufficiently large that we may view the quantity
Bayes linear kinematics as the proportion of failures in the I g th subdomain, where from de Finetti's representation theorem (de Finetti, 1937) , conditional on M(X g ), the X g1 , . . . , X gn g may be viewed as a random sample from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter M(X g ). Therefore M(C)={M(X 1 ), . . . , M(X k )} is the collection of random quantities of interest. From our general experience of elicitation with software testers (Wooff et al., 2002) , we have found that testers often have a fairly detailed knowledge about the probabilities of different types of test failure case, as reflected by a willingness to express a full probability distribution for each M(X g ). For each g, we thus construct a Bayesian graphical model over M(X g )nC(n g ). However, testers usually have a much weaker feel for the more challenging task of assessing the relationships between different types of failure, and so are unwilling or unable to make a meaningful joint probabilistic specification across all M(X g ). Therefore, as an alternative to full Bayes modelling, we use the Bayes linear Bayes graphical model, which we complete by making a second-order specification over the elements M(C) that is consistent with the marginal variance for each M(X g ). The collection of random quantities M(C)nC(N) and the given specifications thus form a Bayes linear Bayes graphical model.
Suppose we now perform the n g tests in the I g th subdomain. We may update our beliefs about M(X g ) using full Bayesian updating, from which we obtain a new second-order specification, tM(X g )r n , and then propagate these new beliefs to the remaining members
) is judged independent of M(C), so that our new beliefs over M(C), tM(C)r n , are obtained from our old beliefs, tM(C)r o , by Bayes linear kinematics on tM(X g )r n . This approach may be compared to that suggested in Coolen et al. (2001), who carried out simple Bayes linear fitting given the data. We expect a more informative belief adjustment, as we exploit more prior judgements by using full marginal Bayesian belief specifications; an illustration of such improvement is given in § § 3·3 and 5·2 below.
3·3. Partition testing example: T he triangle classification problem
To illustrate the above development, we consider the triangle classification problem. This example is widely discussed in the software-testing literature as it displays, in simple form, important issues arising in partition testing. The input in this problem is three positive integers AÁBÁC and the output of the program is whether or not the integers form the sides of a triangle and, if they do, what kind of triangle they form. For example, Weyuker & Ostrand (1980) discuss this problem, and specify a partition into nine subdomains, which we combine, for this illustration, into five subdomains as follows: For many software-testing problems, if faults are uncovered then the software is fixed and retested. Therefore, the critical case is when no fault is found in the test suite, as we must then decide whether the software is ready for use or whether further testing is required. A reasonable criterion for a good test suite is that if all tests pass then we have high confidence in the reliability of the software. For simplicity, we shall assume that the prior distribution for each
), as this is the conjugate prior distribution for binomial sampling. In this section, we shall only consider testing when all of our tests are successfully carried out upon the same subdomain. Thus, suppose that we choose the I g th subdomain, and carry out n g tests, all of which succeed; that is X gi =0 for each i=1, . . . , n g . Therefore, the posterior distribution of M(X g ), conditional on this choice for C(n g ), is Be (a g , b g +n g ). We are concerned with testing software which is nearly ready for release and so, for a single test, we regard a correct outcome to be at least as likely as a failure. Thus, we choose b g Áa g so that var
For this illustration, so that we may assess the effect of the marginal probabilistic specifications, we choose the specification corresponding to the second-order specification for these values made in Example 1 of Coolen et al. (2001) , in which observations on the five subdomains were treated as second-order exchangeable. We specify
From these marginal specifications, we have that E o {M(C) 
Observing n g successes in the I g th subdomain results in the new specification tM(X g )r g for M(X g ), where
We obtain tM(C)r g from tM(C)r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tM(X g )r g ; we calculate E g {M(C)} and var g {M(C)} using (16) and (17). We may compare our new beliefs, tM(C)r g , obtained by exploiting Bayes linear kinematics, with those obtained using a conventional Bayes linear analysis, tM(C)/C(n g )r o , where the adjusted mean is E og {M(C)} and the adjusted variance is var og {M(C)}. Note that, because C(n g
) consists of events, from (7), we have E g {M(C)}=E og {M(C)}. The common expectations, for each g, are shown in Table 1 . Table 2 provides a comparison of the variances. Our new variance for M(C), var g {M(C)}, is a 5×5 matrix of complicated expressions in n g . However, from (9), we may write Table 2 : T riangle classification problem. For each g, representations of the revised variance matrix for a sample of size n g , where E 5,g denotes the 5×5 matrix whose only nonzero entry is the (g, g)th entry, which is 1 from which we may deduce that the matrix var−1 g {M(C)}−var−1 o {M(C)} has a simple form, shown as the first column of Table 2 . The matrix
is, for each g, a multiple of the identity matrix; see the second column of Table 2 . Hence, for any n g , the ratio of the variance reduction from the Bayes linear Bayes model to the variance reduction from the Bayes linear graphical model is the same for every M(X)µ M(C) . The ratios show that we reduce our prior variance for M(X) at least as quickly using the Bayes linear kinematics approach as by using a Bayes linear co-exchangeable model and that the difference increases as E o {M(X)} gets closer to zero: the number of tests required to reduce the prior variance to a prescribed level is reduced. The third column shows the sample size, max g , required to maximise this ratio and RRvar g,max g {M(C)}. We have restricted attention to taking tests in a single subdomain. In practice, we want to take tests in multiple subdomains and use these to update our beliefs over M(C). We now consider making successive revisions within the Bayes linear kinematic approach.
S   B  
4·1. Successive probability kinematics Consider the following example. My local radio station is to air a classic recording of Romeo and Juliet this weekend. I let X take the value 2, 1 or 0 if, respectively, Romeo is played by Laurence Olivier, John Gielgud or neither of them. Also, Y takes the value 2, 1 or 0 if, respectively, Juliet is played by Vivien Leigh, Peggy Ashcroft or neither of them. Letting B={X, Y }, I specify my prior means, variances and covariances, yielding the specification tBr o . Suppose that I hear a trailer for the show, which I judge likely to identify Olivier, but some doubt remains; I revise my beliefs about X, tXr o , to tXr R . I assess that if I were now told who the actor was then the excerpt would be irrelevant to my subsequent belief adjustment. I may obtain tBr R from tBr o by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr R . Later, I hear another trailer which I judge likely to identify Ashcroft, but again doubt remains. I revise tY r R to tY r RJ . I assess that if I were now to be given the identity of the actress playing Juliet then the trailer would be irrelevant to my subsequent belief adjustment. I may obtain tBr RJ from tBr R by Bayes linear kinematics on tY r RJ . Suppose that I had heard the excerpts in the reverse order. If I assess that, at any stage, the actor's identity is sufficient for the quotation heard, then I may first obtain tBr J by Bayes linear kinematics on tY r J and then tBr JR by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr JR . Under what circumstances should tBr RJ =tBr JR ? There has been much debate (Domotor, 1980; Skyrms, 1986; van Fraassen, 1989; Dö ring, 1999) about the fact that successive probability kinematics based first upon a partition X=(X 1 , . . . , X k ) with new probabilities P n (X i ) and then a partition Y=(Y 1 , . . . , Y k∞ ) with new probabilities P n (Y j ) do not necessarily commute when the order of updating is reversed. As Lange (2000) points out, merely changing the order of the entering of the numbers P n (X i ) and P n (Y j ) in the kinematics formula (2) does not really correspond with the switching of the order of the two sensory experiences that yielded P n (X i ) and P n (Y j ). Probability kinematics allows us to incorporate reflection so it is entirely natural that the order of updating is relevant. Indeed, it could be argued that it is only when the successive revisions commute that we have identical experiences. In the Romeo and Juliet example, we may therefore desire commutativity to reflect that our revisions derive only from what we heard.
The conditions under which successive updating by probability kinematics commute have been studied by Field (1978) , Diaconis & Zabell (1982 ), Jeffrey (1988 ) and Wagner (2002 . We consider the general case, allowing the new probabilities at the second stage to depend upon the information received at the first stage, so that, for example, in the Romeo and Juliet example, the new beliefs following the hearing of the Juliet excerpt depend upon whether or not we have first heard the Romeo trailer. Note that (2) may be expressed as
) is the ratio of new-to-old probabilities. Consider successive probability kinematics based on two different partitions, E={E 1 , . . . , E m } and F={F 1 , . . . , F n }, and let P 1 come from P o by probability kinematics on P 1 (E) and P 12 come from P 1 by probability kinematics on P 12 (F). Considered in the reverse order we let P 2 come from P o by probability kinematics on P 2 (F) and P 21 come from P 2 by probability kinematics on P 21 (E). For events A and B the Bayes factor b n,o 
4·2. Successive Bayes linear kinematics on B*=AnXnY
We consider successive belief revisions using Bayes linear kinematics. Suppose that A, X and Y are three collections of random quantities and let B*=AnXnY denote the total collection. We attach to B* the original second-order specification tB*r o ={E o (B*), var o (B*)}. We receive some new information about X which causes us to give a new specification tXr 1 ={E 1 (X), var 1 (X)}, and we judge that tB*r 1 is obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr 1 , so that, from Theorem 1,
where
. Following this revision, we then receive new information about Y which causes us to give a new specification tYr 12 ={E 12 (Y), var 12 (Y)}. We obtain tB*r 12 from tB*r 1 by Bayes linear kinematics on tYr 12 so that, from Theorem 1,
with VkAnX and
We let B=XnY denote the total collection of random quantities about which we directly received new information.
The analogous problem in probability kinematics was studied by Jeffrey (1988) . He investigated what happens when probability kinematics is applied successively to two different partitions, E={E 1 , . . . , E m } and F={F 1 , . . . , F n }, where we do not restrict the corresponding s-field to E×F={EF : EµE, FµF}, so that P 1 comes from P o by probability kinematics on P 1 (E) and P 12 comes from P 1 by probability kinematics on P 12 (F). He shows that, in this case, P 12 comes from P o by probability kinematics on P 12 (E×F). We now develop the corresponding theorem for Bayes linear kinematics; the proof is in the Appendix.
T 3. If tB*r 1 is obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr 1 and tB*r 12 is obtained from tB*r 1 by Bayes linear kinematics on tYr 12 then tB*r 12 is equivalently obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tBr 12 .
We may thus combine the two-step Bayes linear kinematic into a single Bayes linear kinematic, as Fig. 1(a) illustrates.
Suppose that we now view the revisions in the reverse order: we commence with tB*r o and receive new information about Y, giving new specification tYr 2 ={E 2 (Y), var 2 (Y)}, so that tB*r 2 is obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tYr 2 . The format of tB*r 2 may be deduced from Theorem 1 and consists of equations (18)- (20), with X, U and '1' respectively replaced by Y, V and '2'. The resultant equations we label, respectively, as (18*)-(20*), so that, for example, (19*) is where
New information is then received about X, giving new specification tXr 21 ={E 21 (X), var 21 (X)}, so that tB*r 21 is obtained from tB*r 2 by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr 21
. The form of tB*r 21 is obtained from Theorem 1 and consists of the respective replacement of Y, V and '12' in (21)- (23) by X, U and '21' to obtain (21*)-(23*), where, for example, with W 2,X(U)
. Note that our approach is completely general, with no requirement that tXr 1 =tXr 21 nor that tYr 2 =tYr 12 . These revisions are summarised in Fig. 1(b) .
We consider the consequences of imposing the requirement of commutativity, that is tB*r 12 =tB*r 21 . The following corollary shows that commutativity over B ensures commutativity over B*. C 1. If, respectively, tB*r 1 and tB*r 2 are obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tXr 1 and tYr 2 , and tB*r 12 and tB*r 21 are obtained from tB*r 1 and tB*r 2 by Bayes linear kinematics on tYr 12
and tXr 21 , then tB*r 12 =tB*r 21 if and only if tBr 12 =tBr 21 .
Proof. From Theorem 3, tB*r 12 and tB*r 21 come from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on, respectively, tBr 12 and tBr 21 and the result thus follows. %
We now derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that the requirement of commutativity, that is tB*r 12 =tB*r 21 , uniquely determines the overall Bayes linear kinematic and the corresponding conditions under which there is no possible solution achieving commutativity. From Corollary 1 we need only explore these conditions for the reduced collection, B. The conditions will turn out to depend on the eigenstructure of an object termed the kinematic resolution transform which we now describe.
4·3. Belief transforms: T he joint kinematic resolution transform Goldstein (1991) describes a general approach to the comparison of two stochastic specifications, (. , .) and {. , .}, over a collection of random quantities, C, of interest. By viewing {. , .} as a bounded symmetric positive semidefinite sesquilinear functional (Bachman & Narici, 2000 , § 20.4), Goldstein (1991 makes the following definition. Bayes linear kinematics D 2. T he bounded self -adjoint operator S defined by the relationship that, for all A, Bµ C , {A, B}=(A, SB) is termed the belief transform for (. , .) associated with {. , .}. T he complementary belief transform T is defined by T =I−S, where I is the identity operator over C .
If C={C 1 , . . . , C r } then S may be represented as the matrix S(C)=V −1U, where V is the r×r matrix whose (i, j )th entry is (C i , C j ) and U is the r×r matrix whose (i, j )th entry is {C i , C j }. Denote the set of eigenvectors of S(C) by z 1 , . . . , z r with corresponding eigen-
for each iNj and are standardised so that (Z i , Z i )=1. If l i N0 then we term Z i a proper standardised eigenvector and l i a proper eigenvalue of S. The collection Z={Z 1 , . . . , Z r } forms a basis for C so that the ratio D(A), for all Aµ C , of specifications is given by
Thus, Z may be viewed as an orthogonal grid over C summarising the nature and degree of difference between (. , .) and {. , .}; constrained by being orthogonal to (
is Goldstein, 1981) . We now introduce a further belief transform which is fundamental in assessing commutativity for successive Bayes linear kinematic updates. 
Denote the set of eigenvectors of W Y (X) by z 1 , . . . , z r with corresponding eigenvalues We consider revising our beliefs following the observation of^2 k=1 D g k . Using Theorem 1 we obtain tB*r g 1 and tB*r g 2 . Assuming that the largest eigenvalue of W B g1 (B g 2 ) is less than 1, we obtain tB*r g 1 g 2 =tB*r g 2 g 1 , the unique commutative Bayes linear kinematics update which incorporates^2 k=1 D g k , from tB*r o , tB*r g 1 and tB*r g 2 using Theorem 5. From Theorem 3, tB*r g 1 g 2 is equivalently obtained from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on t^2 k=1 B g k r g 1 g 2 . We now add the observation D g 3 . If the largest eigenvalue of W^2 k=1 B gk (B g 3 ) is less than one, then we obtain tB*r g 1 g 2 g 3 =tB*r g 3 g 1 g 2 , the revised specification over B* incorporating^3 k=1 D g k , from Theorem 5 using tB*r o , tB*r g 1 g 2
and tB*r g 3 . From Theorem 3, we equivalently obtain tB*r g 1 g 2 g 3 from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on t^3 k=1 B g k r g 1 g 2 g 3 . We now add D g 4 and so on. An algorithm for such a sequential sequence of updates is as follows.
Suppose that we obtain tB*r g [m] and tB*r g m+1 , respectively, from tB*r o by Bayes linear kinematics on tB[m]r g [m] and tB g m+1 r g m+1 , and tB*r g 
Here tB*r g (B g m+1 ) to be less than one is that dvar−1
. The following corollary is immediate.
for all k=1, . . . , s then we may obtain tB*r g [s] by recursive use of (32) and (33) for m=1, . . . , s−1 with is constructed from the specifications tB*r o and tB*r g k for each k=1, . . . , s and that the order in which we enter the data is irrelevant, as is the case in the example we consider in this paper.
5·2. T he triangle classification problem revisited: Observing multiple subdomains
Recall the triangle classification problem of § 3·3 where, for a sample of size n g , each tM(X g )r g was given; see Tables 1 and 2 . Note that, for each g and n g , var o {M(X g )}>var g {M(X g )}. We examine the revision of our beliefs over M(C) following observations from multiple subdomains; we use successive commutative Bayes linear kinematic updates as described in § 5·1. If we perform the collection of tests C(N)=^5 g=1 C(n g ) then we may use tM(C)r o , tM(C)r 1 , . . . , tM(C)r 5 via (34) and (35) to construct our revised beliefs over M(C) following observation of C(N). We denote these beliefs by tM(C)r C(N) with where var oC(N) {M(X g )} is the Bayes linear adjusted variance for the data C(N); these are plotted in Fig. 2(c) . Note that, except for RRvar{M(X 1 )}=RRvar{M(X 2 )} because of the symmetry of prior specification, these differ for each subdomain but remain larger than one, showing that the number of tests required to reduce each M(X g ) to a presubscribed level is less for the successive kinematic revisions than for the Bayes linear adjustment. Note that the closer E o {M(X g )} is to zero, the more we benefit from the kinematic approach.
D
Bayes linear kinematics offer the natural generalisation of probability kinematics for propagating generalised changes in belief through partially specified belief systems, based around expectation as primitive. Commutativity issues play a similar role in linear kinematics as in probability kinematics, and we have given a full analysis as to when and to what extent such commutativity may be achieved. The application of Bayes linear kinematics to Bayes linear Bayes graphical models shows the flexibility that we may achieve with such an approach as it allows us to combine the simplicity and tractability of belief specification and analysis which we usually associate with Gaussian graphical models with the ability to absorb data into the model by conditioning on marginal distributions of any form. A This work has been supported by a grant from the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council and was undertaken whilst both authors were members of the Department of Mathematical Sciences at the University of Durham.
